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Abstract
Purpose: To determine the predictive capacity of  two Z scoring models in situations of  bankruptcy in
the Spanish context.
Design/methodology: The research intends to answer four questions: (1) Is Altman's Z scoring model
a better predictor of  possible financial problems than the version developed by Amat et al.? (2) Is the
timing of  the economic cycle a condition of  the temporary gap (pre-crisis period, crisis and post-crisis)
in the models proposed by Altman and Amat et al.? (3) Is the business sector a condition of  the
temporary gap in the two models? and (4) Is the gap conditioned by the size of  the company in both
scoring models? In order to determine the answers to these questions, and based on the data obtained
from the SABI database for the period 2005 to 2015, a descriptive and bivariate analysis is performed. 
Findings: The application of  statistical techniques reveal that in Spanish companies, the Amat et al.
scoring model is more effective in the early detection of  financial problems than the Altman scoring
model.
Research limitations/implications: The research has focused on bankrupt Spanish companies prior
to February 2017. Therefore, the conclusions could differ in the case of  expanding the sample.
Practical implications: Due to the fact that insolvency is a problem that concerns different social
actors, such as shareholders, suppliers, financial institutions and workers, it is important to know the
predictive capacity of  the different scoring models in order to make adequate decisions.
Social implications: It is important to know the predictive capacity of  the different scoring models to
generate third-party confidence in relation to the companies. This also improves the transparency of
companies vis-à-vis third parties.
Originality/value: There is a large body of  literature related to the early detection of  bankruptcies, but 
there is a lack of  literature on the early detection of  financial problems prior to bankruptcy. The 
originality of  the research lies in its focus on the study of  Spanish companies in an effort to detect early 
financial problems.
Keywords: Bankruptcy, Scoring models, Prediction, Financial problems
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1. Introduction
The recent economic and financial crisis has rekindled the debate on the management of  financial risk and the
reliability of  the models for predicting business failure. The research on the predictive capacity of  these models
has pivoted between solutions that use historical data from financial statements as their basis and those that
include information on the market and macroeconomic context (Tinoco & Wilson, 2013).
Among the first, the Altman model (1968) with its subsequent adaptations continues to be one of  the most
commonly studied. From the author’s initial formulation based on a sample of  66 American listed industrial
companies, he defines a synthetic indicator based on accounting ratios that enable us to classify companies
according to their financial risk. Later studies have analyzed the different limitations that conditioned its initial
formula, and in spite of  this, it makes several contributions that demonstrate its validity today. Among these
limitations are the sectoral uniformity of  the initial sample, the temporal and geographic scope of  the study and
the methodology used, among others.
In turn, and in light of  the gap that exists between the detection of  a financial risk and its later entry into
bankruptcy, the validity of  the model has been question, in terms of  its power to predict legal bankruptcy
situations, even more so when they depend on factors that go beyond the exclusively financial conditioning
factors.
In order to verify the validity of  the model in the Spanish context, the study described here analyzes the
reliability of  the most recent version of  the Altman model (1983) and one of  its adaptations to the Spanish
context (Amat, Manini & Renart, 2016), in order to determine whether the variables related to the business
sector, company size or the time in the economic cycle when the measurement is taken, condition the time gap
that occurs between the detection of  the financial risk and the bankruptcy situation.
2. Contribution of  the literature
In the framework of  the models predicting the business bankruptcy situation based on accounting information,
the Altman model (1968) and its subsequent evolutions continue to be the leading model.
To develop his predictive model, Altman (1968) selected a set of  22 financial ratios capable of  predicting
situations of  bankruptcy. Through a linear discriminant analysis (LDA), Altman identified a combination of  five
ratios capable of  discriminating between companies that are in a bankruptcy situation and those that are not.
This combination of  ratios, or synthetic indicator, also referred to as the Z-Score, consists of  five accounting
ratios, each weighted by a coefficient. Each of  the 5 ratios used belonged to one of  the following categories:
liquidity, profitability, indebtedness, solvency and rotation.
After applying numerous tests, the linear function that best identified, from a paired sample of  66 traded
American companies in the industrial sector, the 33 companies that went bankrupt within the next two years
following the closing date on the statements used, was that shown below:
Z=1.2X1+1.4X2+3.3X3+0.6X4+0.999X5
Where, X1 is the working capital/total assets, X2 is the retained profit/total assets, X3 is the operating profit/total
assets, X4 is the market value of  the net equity/total debt and X5 is the total sales/total assets.
Having obtained this synthetic indicator, the lower the Z value, the greater is the likelihood of  bankruptcy. The
testing of  the Altman model determined certain ranges that would permit companies to be classified, according
to their financial health. Accordingly, if  the Z-score is lower than 1.81, it can be determined that the company is
at risk for bankruptcy, while if  it is above 2.99, it can be considered to have good financial health; if  it falls
between the two values indicated, it is considered to have an uncertain position, where it would be difficult to
predict its future evolution.
This model, originally developed based on accounting data from 66 traded American manufacturing companies,
was later adapted for non-traded manufacturing companies (Altman, 1983). During the re-estimation process, the
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value of X4 was replaced by X4', defined as the accounting value of  the net equity/total debt, thus eliminating
any reference to the market value. Following the same process as that used in 1968, the new indicator, renamed
with the expression Z´, was defined as follows:
Z'=0.717X1+0.847X2+3.107X3+0.42X4+0.998X5
Where, X1 is the working capital/total assets, X2 is the retained profit/total assets, X3 is the operating profit/total
assets, X4 is the market value of  the net equity/total debt and X5 is the total sales/total assets.
And the redefined ranges for the following frontier values are: 1.23 (instead of  1.81) and 2.9 (instead of  2.99).
In turn, and in the same work (Altman, 1983), the author adapted the model to non-manufacturing companies.
This time the model was called Z´´- Score, and was defined as:
Z''=6.56X1+3.26X2+6.72X3+1.05X4
In this case, X1 is the working capital/total assets, X2 the retained profit/total assets, X3 the operating
profit/total assets and X4 the net accounting value/total debt. And the intervals are defined as follows: if Z´´ is
less than 1.1, the company is at risk for bankruptcy, and if  it is above 2.6, the company has good financial health;
but on the other hand, if  it is between the two values, it is difficult to predict its future evolution.
In the wake of  Altman, and in light of  the limitations inherent to both the sample used and the methodology
applied, many authors have analyzed the goodness of  fit of  the model  in contexts other than the original ones,
and many have also offered new predictive solutions for business bankruptcy (Moyer, 1977; Zmijewski, 1984;
Mensah, 1984; Holmen, 1988; Begley, Ming & Watts, 1996; Grice & Ingram, 2001; Balcaen & Ooghe, 2006).
Some of  these authors have tried to overcome the limitation inherent in the time frame of  Altman’s study
(Begley et al., 1996; Mensah, 1984). The results indicate that the predictive capacity of  the model is not stable
over time and therefore it is influenced by the financial periods being analyzed. Grice and Ingram (2001), in turn,
provide empirical evidence that shows that these models are valid, although their predictive capacity worsens
when applied to recent periods. In these cases, it is better to re-estimate the model and work with updated
coefficients. These studies show that, while the structure of  the model is still useful as a predictor, the value of
the coefficients does not remain stable over time.
Another limitation of  the model that later works have attempted to overcome is the size of  the sample used by
Altman and the lack of  proportionality it has with the real situation of  companies in a bankruptcy situation, as
compared to the rest of  the companies with no financial risk (Zmijewski, 1984). Studies such as that by Platt and
Platt (1991), in turn, have demonstrated that better results are obtained when the coefficients are adjusted
according to the specific sector being analyzed.
Another aspect that has been questioned is whether the model should be used as a predictor of  a company’s
bankruptcy or as an indicator of  financial difficulties, leaving aside the insolvency that may result from them. In
this regard, Grice and Ingram (2001) state that, while companies with financial difficulties have a greater
likelihood of  going bankrupt than financially healthy companies, many of  these companies do not end up
declaring bankruptcy. In this sense, the authors warn that one of  the limitations of  the Z indicator is that it does
not include any variable related to conditioning factors that are non-financial in nature, that hasten the court
declarations of  insolvency (credit, labor and legal situations, etc.). For this reason, and having tested the
consistency of  the model, the authors have determined that the model does not discriminate beyond financial
insolvency, and therefore does not present a better fit for companies in a technical situation of  insolvency.
Using a similar argument, Tinoco and Wilson (2013) sustain that the “legal” date a company declares bankruptcy
does not represent the “real” date of  financial insolvency. Contributing an analysis of  British firms, the authors
show that there is a marked time delay (as much as three years, and with a mean of  1.17 years) between the time
when companies enter into a state of  financial insolvency and the legal date of  their declaration of  bankruptcy.
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This evidence is consistent with the results of  Theodossiou (1993), which show a delay of  approximately 2 years
for American companies.
Finally, in reference to its initial geographic limitation, we can highlight those studies that have considered the
applicability of  the model to specific geographic contexts, other than the American setting (Xu & Zhang, 2009;
Almamy, Aston & Ngwa, 2016; Boďa & Úradníček, 2016; Amat et al., 2016). As a general conclusion, we can
indicate that the different works carried out reveal that a readjustment of  the coefficients, and in some cases, of
the variables used, based on the specific situation of  the geographic area analyzed, provides a better predictive
capacity for the model.
In this sense, and due to its relevance for the work presented below, we can highlight the work by Amat et al.
(2016), which develops a version of  the Altman model with a better capacity to detect situations of  insolvency in
the Spanish context. In this case, and based on a set of  40 ratios that have previously been used in the literature
analyzed to detect business insolvencies, a linear discriminant analysis is applied to detect a combination of  ratios
that better discriminate the companies in a situation of  financial insolvency. To accomplish this, a group of  2,000
companies were analyzed that received short-term loans from a certain bank during 2008.Of  the 2,000 loans
granted, 144 presented repayment problems during the period between when the loan was granted and the end
of  2010.
The analysis of  the results obtained enabled the authors to develop a Z* indicator different from that of  Altman,
which is specified by the following expression:
Z*=-3.9+1.28X1+6.1X2+6.5X3+4.8X4
Where X1 is the current assets/current liabilities, X2 the net equity/total assets, X3 the net results/total assets and
X4 the net results/net equity. The ranges defined in this model are: if Z* is less than 0, it can be determined that
the company might have financial problems, and if  it is greater than 0, it can be considered to have good
financial health.
From the literature presented, which reveals that in spite of  the limitations indicated, the Altman model is still
one of  the most commonly used, the work presented below intends to determine its predictive capacity in
insolvency situations in the Spanish context. It thus intends to answer the following research questions:
• Is the most recent version of  the Altman model a better predictor of  possible financial problems than
the version developed by Amat et al.?
• Does the time during the economic cycle (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis) in the Altman and Amat et al.
models condition the time delay?
• Does the business sector condition the time delay in the two models?
• Does the size of  the company, in both models, condition the delay?
To answer these questions, the work is divided into the sections highlighted below: first, the methodology used is
described, followed by the analysis of  the results obtained and ending with the conclusions drawn from the
study.
3. Methodology
Based on the data obtained from the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System (SABI) for the companies involved
in bankruptcy proceedings in February 2017 and for the period 2005 to 2015, a descriptive and bivariate analysis
was carried out in order to answer the questions raised.
This interval is chosen as it includes the periods prior to the economic crisis (2005-2007), during the crisis (2008-
2013) and after the crisis (2014 and 2015), according to the terms established by the INE (National Institute of
Statistics), based on the evolution of  the Spanish gross domestic product (GDP).
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A total of  1,132 companies were obtained from the SABI. Given the needs proposed by the calculations
involved in the two scoring models, the number of  companies with sufficient valid data to perform the
calculations was smaller than the total. Therefore, to calculate the Altman Z” index, the sample used includes 453
valid observations (40.02%), and to calculate the index by Amat et al., Z*, the sample is 450 (39.75%).
Of  these companies, it is observed that in some cases, the index does not detect the bankruptcy situation
throughout the entire period studied. Accordingly, 61 cases are observed for Altman’s Z” index and 19 cases for
the Z index described by Amat. Therefore, the final sample consists of  392 (34.63%) valid cases for Altman’s Z”
and 431 (38.07%) for the Z* index by Amat et al.
A new variable is calculated for each company and model, which we call the “time delay,” and which shows the
difference between the first time that the index of  a model detects possible financial problems until bankruptcy
proceedings are officially begun.
Likewise, the sample is segmented as follows:
• By sector: based on the official CNAE classification for 2009, it is determined whether a company
belongs to the agricultural (subgroups 01 to 03), industrial (subgroups 05 to 32 and 35), construction
(subgroups 41 to 43) or services (subgroups 33, 36 to 39 and 45 to 99) sectors, as described by García-
Gallego and Mures-Quintana (2013).
• By size: according to the number of  employees on staff  in 2016, we have microenterprises (less than
10), small businesses (10-50), medium-sized companies (51-250) and large companies (more than 250).
• For the structural period of  the Spanish economy: pre-crisis (2005-2007), crisis (2008-2013) and post-
crisis (2014-2015).In order to classify it into one period or another, reference is made to the first time
that the index, either by Altman or Amat et al., detects possible financial problems.
The analysis is carried out using traditional statistical techniques. Specifically, a descriptive analysis is carried out,
using contingency tables to evaluate whether the delay between the time when an index detects financial
problems in a company and bankruptcy is declared is conditioned by the economic sector into which the
company is classified, the size of  the company or the economic period. As Amat et al. (2016) argues, we use
these techniques because the aim is to monitor Altman’s (1968) focus and because good performance has been
demonstrated in the previous literature (Amat et al., 2016; Abdou and Pointon, 2011).
4. Study results
The results obtained are structured in two sections; the first analyzes whether the Altman model and the model
by Amat et al. are good predictors to detect bankruptcy situations, and the second studies which of  the selected
variables (sector, size and economic cycle), for both models, condition the time delay between the detection of
the possible insolvency of  a company and the declaration of  bankruptcy.
4.1. Predictive capacity of  the models by Altman and by Amat et al.
The analysis of  Table 1 shows a great predictive capacity for both models, since the total percentages of
detection are greater than 87%.However, the Z scoring model by Amat et al. is more effective than the Z’’
scoring model by Altman, having detected financial problems prior to the declaration of  bankruptcy in 95.8% of
the companies.
Model Total number of  companiesin bankruptcy (1)
Possible insolvency detected by
the model (2)
Effectiveness of  detection
(2/1) x 100
Altman's Z’’ 453 392 86.5%
Amat’s Z* 450 431 95.8%
Table 1. Percentage of  bankruptcy detection in the models
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These high percentages have been observed over an interval of  11 years (2005-2015).Upon further analysis, we
see in Table 2 that more than 70% of  the companies in bankruptcy proceedings have a time delay of  six to
twelve years between the year in which both models detected possible financial problems and the declaration of
bankruptcy by the companies. Only one-fifth of  the companies experienced a delay of  between one and three
years. The results of  both models are independent, and there is no relationship between them (Pearson’s Chi-
square statistic has a value of  605.508, with a significance of  0.00, although 33.3% of  the boxes have an expected
value of  less than 5).
Time delay Companies according to theZ’’ model by Altman
Companies according to the
Z* model by Amat et al.
1-3 years 90 23% 87 20.2%
4 and 5 years 26 6.6% 28 6.5%
6-12 years 276 70.4% 316 73.3%
 392 100% 431 100%
Table 2. Delay in years in each model
4.2. Variables that condition the delay
Contingency tables are used to analyze the combined frequency distribution between the delay and three
variables: economic sector, company size and economic period, evaluating the relationship between the variables
using the chi-square statistic.
The results of  the contrast statistic show that in both models, there are only significant differences between the
delay and the economic period (Tables 3 and 4). Therefore, the delay variable is not conditioned by either the
economic sector in which the company’s activity is performed, or by the size of  the company. Therefore, the
next step was to analyze the direction in which the delay was conditioned by the economic period for both
models.
4.2.1. Effect of  the economic period on the delay for the Altman model
Variables Economic period Total Contrast statisticPre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Time 
delay
1-3 years
1
1.1%
0.4%
0.3%
29
32.2%
29.6%
7.4%
60
66.7%
100%
15.3%
90
100%
23%
23%
 
χ2=357.6971
Sig.0.000
4 and 5 years
1
3.8%
0.4%
0.3%
25
96.2%
25.5%
6.4%
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
26
100%
6.6%
6.6%
6-12 years
232
84.1%
99.1%
59.18%
44
15.9%
44.9%
11.22%
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
276
100%
70.4%
70.4%
 
Total
234
59.7%
100%
98
25.0%
100%
60
15.3%
100%
392
100%
100%
 
11 box (11.1%) has an expected frequency of  less than 5
Table 3. Time delay according to the economic period of  the Altman model
Table 3 shows that the 1-3 year time delay observed corresponds primarily to the post-crisis period of  the
economy (66.7%). On the other hand, if  the delay variable is between 4 and 5 years, no detection is observed in
the post-crisis period (0%), with this corresponding almost exclusively to the crisis period (96.2%). However, if
the delay is greater than 6 years, the period to which it corresponds is basically the pre-crisis period (84.1%).
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Furthermore, the distribution within the crisis period between the three delay groups is greater than 25% for
each. By contrast, in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, we find an important difference with respect to the
former, as there is a concentration of  100% in the 1-3 years segment of  the post-crisis period and 99.1% in the
6-12 years segment of  the pre-crisis period.
Therefore, in companies in bankruptcy, the Altman model detected 70.4% of  the companies with possible financial
problems between 6 and 12 years before they declared bankruptcy. These correspond primarily (84.1%) to the pre-crisis
period.
4.2.2. Effect of  the economic period on the delay for the model by Amat et al.
If  we focus on the model by Amat et al., the results are no different than those for the Altman model. Table 4
shows that the delay of  between 1 and 3 years has corresponded primarily to the post-crisis economic period
(66.7%). On the other hand, if  the delay is between 4 and 5 years, there is no detection in the post-crisis period
(0%), as this corresponds almost exclusively to the crisis period (96.4%). Meanwhile, if  the delay is greater than 6
years, the period to which it corresponds is basically the pre-crisis period (87.3%).
In addition, the distribution within the crisis period between the three delay groups is greater than 28% for each.
By contrast, in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, we find an important difference with respect to the former,
as in the first period 100% are concentrated in the 1-3 years segment, and in the second, the concentration is in
the 6-12 years segment (99.3%).
As a result, in companies in bankruptcy, the model by Amat et al. detected 73.3% of  the companies with possible
financial problems between 6 and 12 years before they declared bankruptcy. These correspond primarily (87.3%)
to the pre-crisis period.
Variables Economic period Total Contrast statisticPre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Time 
delay
1-3 years
1
1.1%
0.4%
0.2%
28
32.2%
29.5%
6.5%
58
66.7%
100%
13.5%
87
100%
20.2%
20.2%
χ2=412.1161
Sig.0.000
4 and 5 years
1
3.6%
0.4%
0.2%
27
96.4%
28.4%
6.3%
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
28
100%
6.5%
6.5%
6-12 years
276
87.3%
99.3%
64.0%
40
12.7%
42.1%
9.3%
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
316
100%
73.3%
73.3%
 Total
278
64.5%
100%
95
22.0%
100%
58
13.5%
100%
431
100%
100%
 
11 box (11.1%) has an expected frequency of  less than 5
Table 4. Time delay according to the economic period of  the model by Amat et al.
5. Conclusions
The literature on models for predicting bankruptcy have kept the debate alive on the capacity of  models based
on accounting information versus those that use primarily market information. The different studies analyzed
show that the model designed by Altman continues to have many followers, although its predictive power
increases when its formulation is adapted to the context of  the analysis.
Amat et al. (2016) make this adaptation to the Spanish case, finding a new expression with a greater capacity to
detect situations of insolvency. In order to more closely determine the goodness of  fit for said reformulation, the
work presented has contrasted the predictive capacity of  both models for Spanish companies in a situation of
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bankruptcy. In turn, the analysis of  these synthetic indicators for companies in bankruptcy has made it possible
to analyze which are the conditions that determine the time delay between the detection for the first time of
possible financial problems and the legal formalization of  the insolvency situation. The determining factors
analyzed are company size, the sector to which it belongs and the moment in the economic cycle when the
financial problems are detected.
To do this, company data has been obtained from the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System (SABI) database for
those companies that have declared bankruptcy during the period 2005-2015, and a descriptive and bivariate
analysis has been carried out.
The results obtained make it possible to state that while both models are good predictors to detect bankruptcy
situations, the formula by Amat et al. (95.8% detection rate), is more effective than that by Altman (86.5%
detection rate).These results confirm that while Altman’s formula continues to be suitable, its predictive power
improves noticeably when it is adjusted to the specifics of  the context being analyzed.
In relation to the time delay, the analysis performed reveals that, indeed, the economic period conditions said
delay in both models. Specifically, the segment with 1-3 years of  delay corresponds primarily to the post-crisis
period, the segment between 4 and 5 years to the crisis period and the segment with a greater delay to the pre-
crisis period. These results would confirm how the capacity of  companies to resist adverse situations deteriorates
as the period of  economic recession lengthens, becoming most vulnerable once the recovery period is underway.
The rest of  the variables analyzed, sector and size, do not provide any conclusive results.
In any case, the results obtained reinforce the conclusions of  works like that by Tinoco and Wilson (2013) and
Theodossiou (1993), who had already demonstrated that bankruptcy declarations are not justified exclusively by
financial reasons, rather they are influenced by other circumstances that elude the detection capacity of
accounting figures. Therefore, models such as that by Altman, or the Spanish  version by Amat et al. are good
predictors of  financial difficulties, while they do not necessarily predict, or within a specified period, the legal
formalization of  bankruptcy.
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